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ABSTRACT 
The increasing dependency of modern society on IT systems and infrastructures for 
essential services (e.g. internet banking, vehicular network, health-IT, etc.) coupled with 
the growing number of cyber incidents and security vulnerabilities have made cyber 
security operations centre (CSOC) undoubtedly vital. As such security operations 
monitoring is now an integral part of most business operations. SOCs (used 
interchangeably as CSOCs) are responsible for continuously and protectively monitoring 
business services, IT systems and infrastructures to identify vulnerabilities, detect cyber-
attacks, security breaches, policy violations, and to respond to cyber incidents swiftly. 
They must also ensure that security events and alerts are triaged and analysed, while 
coordinating and managing cyber incidents to resolution. Unfortunately, the effectiveness 
f SOCs are a widespread concern and a focus of boundless debate. In this paper, we 
identify and discuss some of the pertinent challenges to building an effective SOC. 
Further, we provide and prioritise recommendations to addressing the identified issues.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cyber security operations centre (CSOC) is an essential business function and 
should arguably be an integral part of all modern business operations and 
national cyber security programmes regardless of scale and size. SOCs are 
responsible for cyber security incident management, cyber-attack detection, 
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continuous and protective security monitoring, log and event management, 
coordination and investigation (Onwubiko, C., & Ouazzane, K., 2019a).  
 
The drivers for establishing SOCs are not only driven by business 
requirements, or necessitated by governance and compliance requirements, 
but also, on demonstrable active risk reduction.  
 
As an integral part of business function, SOCs enable the organisation fulfil 
its business responsibilities and support its cyber security strategy. For 
example, business requirements are underpinned on the appropriate 
functioning of business services, e.g. being secure, being available to 
legitimate users of the systems, and being integral and trusted. By using the 
SOC to continuously and protectively monitor controls (technical, process, 
policy and procedural) and critical and prioritised business assets of the 
organisation can the business meets its overarching requirements. Further, it 
also supports the organisation to meet its business obligations, e.g. business 
continuity, communication strategy and communications readiness. For 
example, the SOC’s incident management playbook, and majority incident 
handling protocol should align and inform the organisation’s communications 
readiness in the event of a significant cyber incident or security breach. 
 
As a compliance requirement, SOCs are used to fulfill regulatory, governance 
and legal compliance and directives, for example, regulatory compliance to 
the payment card industry data security standard (PCI DSS), or compliance 
to information security compliance, e.g. (ISO 27001), Network and 
Information Systems Directive (NIS), General Data Protection Regulations 
(GDPR) etc. 
 
As a mechanism for active risk reduction, SOCs are utilized to measure and 
report key performance indicators (KPIs), such as the percentage of the estate 
or ecosystem being monitored, systems or critical systems being monitored, 
performance of continuous vulnerability scans, health hygiene of the IT 
estate, and progress of any ongoing security incidents and breaches etc. This 
then provides the organisation with a dynamic active risk picture of their 
estate. 
 
An effective SOC comprises three key aspects: 
 Building of the central log collection, aggregation, analysis and 
incident management platform (a.k.a. SOC Monitoring Platform). 
 Onboarding of both new and existing services for continuous 
monitoring by the SOC monitoring platform (a.k.a. Cyber 
Onboarding). 
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 Performing the continuous monitoring by SOC Analysts through 
technology, tools and processes (a.k.a. ‘Eyes-on-Glass’). 
While a SOC monitoring platform may be built but the problem lays with 
onboarding services into it so that they can be continuously and protectively 
monitored. We use the analogy of a building and its content. You could have 
an unfurnished property, where the property is built with the necessary doors 
and windows, but the property is empty and has no content, such as beds, 
chairs, cooker or electricity. The same can be said of a SOC monitoring 
platform without onboarding of the services and infrastructures it was built to 
monitor. Therefore, to have a functioning and operational SOC, then 
onboarding of services, systems and network infrastructure to the SOC 
monitoring platform must occur (Onwubiko, C. and Ouazzane, K., 2019a).  
 
Further, and equally as important, is meeting business requirements, 
especially for a multitenant SOC or a SOC monitoring business services of 
varied security and operational requirements. SOC is not a one-size fits all. It 
must be tailored, however slightly, to meet unique business and operational 
use cases.  
 
Unfortunately, many SOCs are believed to be ineffective. According to 
Schinagl, S., et al., (2015), only a few SOCs are effective in countering 
cybercrime and IT abuse.  
 
Our contributions in this paper are: 
1. This is an extension of our paper, titled “Cyber Onboarding is 
Broken” (Onwubiko, C. and Ouazzane, K., 2019a). 
2. We discuss several SOC operating models and their features. 
3. Finally, we investigate some of the factors contributing to the 
inefficiencies in SOCs, and explain some of the challenges they face.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a 
detailed review of SOCs, covering SOC vs. SIEM, Insource vs. Outsource, 
Cloud SOC, On-Premise and Hybrid SOCs. Cyber Onboarding is briefly 
discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 outlines factors contributing to SOC 
inefficiencies. Section 5 explains challenges facing organisational and 
national SOCs, while Section 6 offers recommendations, conclusions and 
recommendations for future work. 
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2 SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTRE 
Many people conflate SOC with SIEM. A SIEM (Security Information and 
Event Management) is a tool, which offers log management, event and log 
correlation, analysis and dashboard. Conversely, SOC is a business operations 
function comprising People, Process and Technology as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
FIG. 1: SOC FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM 
Fig. 1 is a conceptual representation of a SOC, showing the building blocks - 
people, process and technology. It is pertinent to note that the list of processes, 
or types of technologies, or categories of people shown in Fig. 1 is 
deliberately inexhaustive. 
 
2.1 People 
People comprises analysts, administrators, incident responders, SOC 
manager etc. who perform continuous monitoring (a.k.a. ‘eyes-on-glass’) of 
the organisation’s business services and IT estate by leveraging the 
capabilities offered by Technology e.g. SIEM tool, and guided by the 
organisation’s policies, processes and procedures. So, a SIEM is not a SOC. 
Rather, a SIEM is only a technology constituent part of a SOC. People can be 
subdivided into two broad categories: cyber onboarding people, and SOC 
monitoring and incident management personnel. 
 
2.1.1 Cyber Onboarding 
Cyber onboarding is a multidisciplinary team composed of solutions and 
technical architects, SOC designers, SOC content engineers, business 
analysts, risks and information assurance consultant and project managers 
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(see Fig. 1). These are the people who carry out project related activities to 
ensuring that each business service (a business service usually comprises, at 
the least, systems, network infrastructures and applications) to be monitored 
is properly onboarded to a SOC monitoring and incident management 
platform.  
 
2.1.2 SOC Monitoring and Incident Management  
SOC monitoring and incident management are solely responsible for security 
monitoring, continuous and protective monitoring of onboarded services that 
are in the SOC platform, providing ‘eyes-on-glass’ monitoring1, vulnerability 
scanning, alerting and event analysis, incident triage, cyber incident 
management, coordination and reporting. They are also the custodians for 
fascinating and coordinating major incidents, incident governance and 
command, investigations and post incident reports. SOC monitoring is a 
Business-as-Usual (BAU) and operational function as opposed to cyber 
onboarding that is usually a project-based time-bounded roles. In some 
organisations, the SOC analysts can perform varied roles including threat 
intelligence, intelligence handling, vulnerability management, and threat 
hunting. Note that these roles ought to be performed by specialist individuals 
with the appropriate skills regardless of the organisational structure. 
 
2.2 Processes 
SOC processes in this paper encompass operational guides, local working 
instructions (LWI), knowledge articles (KA), procedures and operations-level 
policies. A sample of some SOC essential processes (see Fig. 1) are cyber 
incident management playbook, incident response process, operational 
runbook or knowledge articles, joiners, movers and leavers (JML) process, 
SOC access control policy, security operating procedures (SyOPS) etc. 
 
2.3 Technology 
The technology aspect, as shown in Fig. 1,  comprises  of the tools that are 
deployed in a typical SOC, such as  SIEM for event analysis, correlation and 
realtime monitoring; web fraud detection (WFD) to detect web-based 
transactional fraud, typically for financial orientated SOCs, IDS/IPS to detect 
and/or prevent intrusions, threat intelligence e.g. malware information 
sharing platform (MISP - an open source threat intel feed) and cyber incident 
management ticketing system for tracking security incidents tickets, 
                                                 
1 ‘Eyes-on-glass’ monitoring is a colloquial to mean people starring on dashboards, computer 
screens, plasma or projector screens as a means of observing, looking, and detecting an 
occurrence. 
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assigning tasks and on-going incidents and issues. There are myriad of SOC 
tools, but the aforementioned ones in this paper are core and essential. 
 
The SIEM market is very mature with well-established products and a set of 
criteria to assess their offerings, e.g. Gartner SIEM Magic Quadrant (Gartner, 
2018). Mainstream tools range from leaders IBM QRadar and Micro Focus 
ArcSight to the niche players such as AT&T Cybersecurity, FireEye 
(Onwubiko, C., and Ouazzane, K., 2019a). 
 
A notable misconception is that many people procure SIEM tools and 
therefore believe they now have a SOC. This is absolutely incorrect. The 
tools, when setup properly, will no doubt help the SOC to perform its 
functions better, provided the ‘the challenging’ task of onboarding systems, 
logs, applications and networks to the SIEM is completed, including having 
the correct parsers, plugins or API (Application Programming Interface) to 
ingest events from disparate log sources e.g. firewall, routers, applications, 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) etc. and also, the ability to ingest network-
wide information such as flow events and threat intelligence information to 
detect emerging and inflight incidents (Onwubiko, C., 2015, 2017, 2018). 
 
A SOC must have the appropriate policies and processes to allow them to 
react swiftly to a cyber incident. For example, a SOC must have a cyber 
incident management playbook to respond to incidents and coordinate 
significant cyber incidents (Onwubiko, C., and Ouazzane, K, 2019b), they 
should have other operating procedures such as SyOPs, cyber recovery 
process, incident response process and reporting and escalation procedures, 
at the minimum. 
 
2.4 Human-in-the-loop 
The people and process aspects, in our opinion, are the fundamental 
difference between a SOC and a SIEM. We argue that SOCs should have 
human-in-the-loop; even with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning (ML) embedded endpoints and point solutions deployed in the SOC 
to better and faster detect threats, yet the need for human-in-the-loop cannot 
be overemphasized. For example, we rely on SOC human operators to make 
decisions on the cause of action (CoA), not just of technology decision, but 
holistic decisions that encompasses social, human, financial, risk, reputation 
and otherwise. We depend on SOC human operators to conduct cyber incident 
management and to invoke governance and cyber incident and security breach 
commands, and of course, reliant on technology for pace and precision.   
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SOC operators (a.k.a. Analysts, Administrators, Incident Responders, Threat 
Hunters, Forensic Investigators etc.) perform several roles ranging from 
continuous monitoring, detection, alert triage to threat hunting, incident 
response and cyber forensic investigation. They continuously monitor 
business assets and services by leveraging the capabilities offered by tools 
and technologies deployed in the organisation’s estate e.g. SIEM, WFD, 
Identity and Access Management, IDS, IPS, Anti-malware, firewalls etc. 
 
Automation, orchestration and robotic process automation (RPA), machine 
intelligence, machine learning and artificial intelligence do play a part, and 
will continue to play a role in providing power, pace and precision to SOC 
operations, process and operational efficiencies, but it is best when they are 
collaborative, cooperative and complementary with humans.  
 
According to (Guerra P., and Tamburello, P., 2018) “continuous monitoring 
and detection will remain part of the cybersecurity operations process for the 
foreseeable future”; however, they acknowledged that cybersecurity 
operations will become increasingly reliant on automation and machine 
intelligence.  
 
2.5 Outsource vs. Insource SOCs 
The drive to ‘outsource’ everything was met with ‘bring everything back in 
house’ a couple of years ago, and recently, we observe that most companies 
now operate a hybrid managed SOC model. This is the case, for example, 
where a framework exists for organisations to outsource some aspects of the 
SOC service e.g. the continuous monitoring aspects (a.k.a. operations security 
monitoring) responsibility to a supplier organisation while incident 
management remains their accountability. 
 
There are many reasons for outsourcing SOC function to supplier 
organisations, the two main reasons are: 
a) The supplier organisation is tasked to do “the heavy lifting and 
shifting” – a perception that the expertise to run a functional SOC is 
readily available in the supplier organisation, hence it is believed 
that the supplier organisation is by far better to run and maintain a 
SOC service, while the client organisation becomes responsible for 
security incident management, escalation and decision making as 
the overarching risk owner.  
b) Most client organisations work 9am to 5pm, therefore, client 
organisations prefer to leverage the 24x72 SOC service operated by 
                                                 
2 24x7 means 24 hours in a day and 7 days in a week. 
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the supplier organisations, a preference many client organisations 
believe to offer cost saving and efficiency in human resource. 
 
2.6 Cloud vs. On-Premise vs. Hybrid SOCs 
Cloud-based SOCs have become a new phenomenon. It is the consolidation 
of an organisations’ monitoring capabilities centrally in a Cloud 
Environment. This encompasses the hosting of the SOC’s Central Log 
Collection Infrastructure or Platform, and the tools and technologies they will 
use to aggregate, collect, collate, curate, process and analyse log, events and 
intelligence in the Cloud.  
 
A SOC Log Collection Platform is the central repository where logs, events, 
network and application metrics are stored, for processing (that is, parsing, 
normalization, correlation, and alerting) either in realtime or later (e.g. batch 
processing or non-realtime processing). This then allows analysis and cross 
correlation of the network information (e.g. flow, packets) and logs and 
events information in order to detect indicators of compromise (IoC) in packet 
payloads, logs and events such that alerts can be triaged, and incident 
response followed in the event of a security breach. 
 
Cloud-based SOCs are becoming popular and increasingly attractive for the 
following reasons:  
a) There are several Cloud-based monitoring tools and technologies 
that complement SIEM tools in the Cloud. The prevalence3 of such 
tools (e.g. CloudTrail, Cloud Watch, Guard Duty, Azure Monitor, 
Network Watcher, Log Analytics, Application Insights etc.) across the 
different regions and among the three known and popular Cloud 
Providers means monitoring of services can be accomplished as 
quickly as possible, now in minutes not days, which is the case with 
on-premise onboarding. 
b) The readiness and availability of APIs (Application programming 
interfaces) and their interoperability means automation and 
integration, which in traditional SIEM posed several problems are 
nonetheless irrelevant in Cloud. 
c) Availability of Cloud versions of the SIEM, that is, SIEM providers 
have built Cloud-based versions of their offering, making their 
products readily available in the Cloud.  
                                                 
3 Cloud-based monitoring tools are available depending on the Cloud Environment you host 
your services, e.g. CloudTrail, CloudWatch, Guard Duty are AWS solutions, while Azure 
Monitor, Network Watcher, Log Analytics and Application Insights are available in MS Azure 
cloud. 
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d) Pre-Integration and integration with other associated tools are 
already done by the Cloud provider, and where it has not been done 
by the provider, it is easy and straightforward. For example, most 
cloud-based SIEM have pre-integration with tools such as identity 
and access management, vulnerability management, threat 
intelligence and anti-malware etc. This means that the SOC can 
leverage the existing pre-integration to deploy services quicker. 
e) The ability to flex up/down compute and infrastructure in a ‘pure’ 
Cloud environment, plus the low cost of entrance (e.g. pay-as-you-
use nature of Cloud) has made Cloud-based SOC (a.k.a. Virtual SOCs) 
a popular and increasingly attractive preposition.  
f) Deliverability and timeliness - Cloud-based SOCs can be built, setup 
and fully functioning in days as opposed to the more traditional On-
Premise SOCs, that take months, at least, to build and setup. 
 
3 CYBER ONBOARDING 
Cyber Onboarding follows a set of well-defined processes to onboard a 
service for cyber security monitoring (see Fig. 2), covering discovery 
workshop, security monitoring requirements gathering, risk assessment, 
topology and architecture design, implementation, assurance and security 
testing, and handover. 
 
FIG. 2: CYBER ONBOARDING PROCESS 
Note: Cyber onboarding tasks can be deployed in an agile methodology, 
which means the entire process lifecycle can be shortened and iterated in 
small and short sprints; therefore, we are not recommending a lengthy 
waterfall method. When deployed in Cloud, these processes can be completed 
in days not months. 
 
These distinct processes are discussed briefly:  
a) Discovery workshops are conducted per organisation, business unit 
or service to be onboard to the SOC monitoring platform in order to 
understand the specific monitoring needs of that organisation, 
business unit or service such that security monitoring is implemented 
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appropriately to address the unique security monitoring requirements 
for that department, business unit or service.  
b) Solutions design, architecture and integration patterns are produced 
based on the organisation’s business needs, hosting arrangements, 
integration requirements, and connectivity options.  
c) Topology map of the existing hosted environments is required in 
order to allow appropriate monitoring use cases to be developed to 
ensure that critical assets of the organisation are protected.  
d) The implemented security monitoring solution will need to be tested 
and assured, and  
e) Finally, the solution is handed over to the SOC to monitor and 
operate. 
 
Cyber Onboarding is a team in a SOC function responsible for ensuring that 
business services to be monitored by the SOC are appropriately onboarded to 
the SOC monitoring platform. This means, ensuring that the business services 
and the underpinning infrastructure and applications within that business area, 
such as firewalls, servers, desktops and network infrastructures are 
configured to produce logs and events, and that these events are transported 
and ingested by the SOC monitoring platform for analysis, correlation, 
alerting and incident triage.  
 
In some organisations, both the cyber onboarding team and the SOC 
monitoring and incident management team are the same; however, in this 
paper, we have presented these teams as distinct but cooperative teams under 
one management. Hence, the cyber onboarding may not exist as a distinct 
business unit in most organisations as their duties are performed by the SOC 
under one accountability business unit. Regardless, the cyber onboarding 
activities as shown in Fig. 2, must be performed to have a functioning and 
operational SOC.  
 
These activities include: 
 creating design patterns and implementing architecture solutions for 
any service (existing or new) to be onboarded to the SOC platform 
for security monitoring;  
 ensuring the assets of the business units to be monitored are enabled 
for logging and events generated by these disparate log sources are 
ingested and monitored by the SOC; 
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 enabling the right parsers and plugins so that logs are normalised4 and 
forwarded to the SOC platform; 
 ensuring that a transport mechanism exists for conveying logs, 
metrics, events, messages and flows from disparate environments to 
a central log collection, aggregation and analysis point for the SOC 
monitoring platform. 
 
These include:  
a) Ingest mechanisms: This is a method to ensure that the different and 
disparate log types generated by the vast array of log sources in the 
monitored estates are appropriately ingested, normalised and 
analysed by the SIEM platform. This means ensuring that an ingest 
mechanism exists e.g., agentless, parser, API and plugin (see log 
source types in Table 1) for the appropriate log type and format; 
otherwise, custom parsers must be developed. Custom parsers are 
especially important for ingesting proprietary logs whose schemas do 
not comply or conform with appropriate and known standards, e.g. 
logging standards such as the IETF RFC 5424 format5.  
 
TABLE 1:MONITORING METRIC AND FORMATS (ONWUBIKO, 
C. 2018) 
S-N Log Source Type Log Source Example  
1 Events and logs Raw log, Alert, Event, Windows events, 
Syslog, Alarm 
2 Network Information  Heartbeat, Flow, Session, Trap 
3 Structured Digital 
Feed 
Scan, Vulnerability Information, PCAP6, 
TVM7, CMDB8, NVD9 
4 Semi and 
Unstructured Digital 
Trace, Manual Input, Wetware  
5 Threat Intelligence  Indicators of Compromise (IoC) 
b) Agent vs agentless: Agent and agentless are both mechanisms to 
ingest events by the SIEM. Agent-based ingest requires a third-party 
application or a package of the SIEM to be installed at the end device 
                                                 
4 Normalisation is a process of using a consistent schema to process data, events or logs in 
exactly the same way so that meta-data types are stored on the same columns, for optimised 
querying and database performance 
5 RFC 5424 – The Syslog Protocol, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5424 
6 PCAP – Packet Capture 
7 TVM – Threat and Vulnerability Management 
8 CMDB – Configuration and Management Database 
9 NVD – National Vulnerability Database 
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or endpoint. This is needed, in most cases, when the SIEM tool does 
not have a matching plugin to ingest logs or events of a particular log 
source type. For example, windows events do not follow the IETF 
RFC 5424 standard hence one way to ingest windows events is to 
install a third-party agent or software at the endpoint to convert 
windows events to syslog compliant format – this processing of using 
a third-party software or an agent to ingest logs and event is regarded 
as agent-based ingestion. The other option is to use agentless method 
where a third-party agent is not required, instead the SIEM tool 
accepts native or raw logs or uses API to receives and ingest the 
events. 
c) Design development: The primary function of the technical and 
solutions architects in the cyber onboarding team is to develop robust 
and reusable architecture patterns, solutions design and integration 
patterns artefacts that allow various systems and business services 
hosted in different locations to be integrated to the SOC monitoring 
platform, allowing the SOC to securely monitor these services and 
systems. The created reusable architecture and solutions artefacts are 
signed-off and approved by the organisation’s technical design 
authorities. 
d) Implementation and testing: The design artefacts need to be 
implemented and tested. Testing can be carried out by other specialist 
teams, however, this activity should be coordinated through the cyber 
onboarding team, since they are the project-based arm of the SOC. 
Testing should not only include assurance testing, but also, security 
testing such as IT health checks, penetration testing and vulnerability 
scanning and testing. This is done so that any vulnerability (intrinsic 
or extrinsic) are mitigated prior to go-live. Since IT health checks are 
carried to establish intrinsic and extrinsic cyber hygiene of the 
solution, then it is best to be conducted by an external or independent 
provider (this is to avoid bias), however, the continuous vulnerability 
and threat management should still remain an in-house activity. 
e) Tagging framework: This is a process of tagging events from specific 
business services as a way of distinguishing and separating services 
and this is particularly important in a multi-tenant and multi-customer 
SOC service, where incident response and escalation maybe different 
for each business services. Tagging is not only used to differentiate 
services, but also useful to manage business services with 
overlapping IP addresses, and where name resolution is not working 
properly. 
f) Alerting and tuning: This is a process of improving the reliability of 
the service by ensuring that ‘noise’ and false positives are reduced 
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and minimised. This is done by filtering out known noise on the 
monitored environment to improve both performance and reliability. 
The purpose of tuning is to baseline the service so that SOC 
alerts/alarms are reliable and trustworthy. Tuning do take time and 
could be considerably longer depending on size, scale and complexity 
of the SOC platform. On the average, it is common to allow three to 
six months for this. 
g) Network groupings: This is a process of customising networks and 
subnets into their appropriate business areas, functions and groups to 
allow for quicker identification of incidents to affected business areas 
and networks. 
h) Content development: This is a process of setting up some of the SOC 
monitoring artefacts such as rules, filters, use cases, queries and 
dashboards etc. Monitoring content is important as different business 
services may face unique risks and concerns; therefore, it is essential 
that the use cases are adapted to address their respective concerns and 
risks.  
i) Report development: This is a process of creating both generic and 
custom monitoring reports for each business area and business 
service being monitored. Reports are used for many purposes, e.g. to 
assess the performance of the SOC service, benchmark the SOC 
service, review service and operation level agreements (SLA/OLA), 
key performance indicators (KPI), and most importantly, to measure 
the return on security investment (RoSI). Cyber metrics such as 
report against the risks mitigated, report on threats prevented or 
incidents encountered can be useful barometers to assess RoSI of the 
SOC (Onwubiko, C. and Onwubiko, A. (2019)). 
 
 
4 Factors Contributing to SOCs Inefficiencies 
We argue that some of the contributory factors to SOC inefficiencies include: 
a) Percentage of the monitored estate – The percentage of the estate 
monitored is often disproportionate to the coverage of the 
organisation. We believe that in some organisations, less than 5% of 
their ecosystem are monitored by their SOCs. 
b) Quality – Most SOCs provide only a general-purpose basic security 
monitoring, using ‘out-of-the-box SIEM rules’ and offering a one-
size-fits-all use case. Only very few create custom use cases or 
bespoke use cases. 
c) Process Maturity – Most SOCs lack the necessary processes, 
procedures and local working instructions required to operate the 
service efficiently.  
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d) Skilled Resource – Most SOCs have resource capability and capacity 
issues (e.g. lack of trained and highly skilled analysts) to run the SOC, 
this may be related to the global skills shortage in Cyber security, 
and, retainership of skilled professionals, which is equally a 
challenge. 
e) Lack of standardisation – SOCs have varying perceptions across 
industry and government. Each organisation has its own 
understanding of what a SOC should do ((Schinagl, S., et al., 2015), 
(Onwubiko, C. and Ouazzane, K., 2019a)). 
 
5 CSOC Challenges  
To build an effective SOC takes time, especially one for a large enterprise, 
such as a government department or financial institution. It is a project that is 
often dependent on a number of factors, e.g. technical, programmatic, 
commercial, logistic and organisational. For instance, the footprint of the 
estate to be monitored, the number of hosting environments to be monitored, 
size, coverage and complexity of the organisation, the quality of monitoring 
required and the size of the project workforce, structure and organisation – 
internal, external, suppliers and partners, procurement frameworks and 
budget etc. That said, it can be accomplished relatively quickly these days by 
leveraging cloud computing. 
 
To understand the challenges, we employed a proven methodology – the 
reframing matrix. 
 
The reframing matrix (Mindtools, 2018), created by Michael Morgan 
(Morgan, M. 1993), is a tool for critical reflection, insight and innovation. An 
ideal tool for analysing organisational issues from various perspectives that 
then allows the problem to be viewed from multi-stakeholder perspectives 
and viewpoints encouraging issues to be seen from different lens, opinions 
and insights. 
 
As a problem-solving tool, the reframing matrix uses the four perspectives 
(4Ps) for insights, viewpoints, interests and concerns. Each quadrant of the 
matrix is a perspective. The problem to be solved is placed at the centre of the 
matrix, and opinions, views and concerns are then sought from the respective 
stakeholders. Based on the different views, solutions to the problems are 
obtained. It is pertinent that the stakeholders (4Ps) are selected based on their 
relevance and importance to the problem domain since the strength of the 
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reframing matrix lies on the fact the different stakeholders with different 
experiences approach problems in different ways. 
 
FIG. 3: CYBER ONBOARDING REFRAMING MATRIX 
Our application of the reframing matrix to cyber onboarding is as shown in 
Fig. 3. First, we put the question been assessed in the middle of a grid. We 
use boxes around the grid for the different perspectives. Each perspective 
represents a stakeholder group consulted in the assessment. The 4Ps are the 
Onboarding Team themselves, the CSOC team, the Client and the Senior 
Management Team (SMT). 
 
Using the reframing matrix to identify the challenges faced by cyber 
onboarding (as shown in Fig. 3), we identified 16 different issues from four 
perspective, namely (clockwise):  
 Onboarding perspective – as the function responsible for 
onboarding services for different clients and business units, they deal 
with the day-to-day fallouts and know the issue best, however, from 
a unique perspective.  
 CSOC perspective – as the custodian for security monitoring, and 
people at the frontline’ of the SOC service, so it is important that they 
are consulted for any reliable solution to the cyber onboarding 
problem to be identified, besides, they are the direct ‘customers’ of 
the Cyber Onboarding Team.  
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 Client Perspective – it is important that we consulted the client for a 
say, after all, they pay and consume the SOC service. If they are not 
happy then the business case for standing a SOC capability could 
easily disintegrate.  
 SMT perspective – these are the senior management team, 
comprising the SRO, CTO, Directors and Heads of service. SMT are 
sponsor, fund and are accountable for the SOC service, therefore has 
an interest and a viewpoint of the problem.  
 
The 16 issues identified are briefly explained. 
From Onboarding perspective, they feel that lacked SMT support on a couple 
of organisational and process issues. They feel SOC is not mature in their 
operations and skillsets. There is a sense of acceptance that cyber onboarding 
is indeed complex and complicated, and there are a number of dependencies 
hindering progress. 
From CSOC perspective, they feel they are not provided with enough 
information feeds to monitor. So the onboarding team are not onboarding 
systems and services quick enough. There is quality issues and incomplete 
documentations provided to them, which then impacts how quickly they can 
react, and also, they feel there are many screens to monitor.  
 
From Client perspective, there is appreciation of lack of funds. So they do not 
have funds to pay for the SOC service, and they feel they should not have to 
pay for a SOC service operated in-house, therefore the funding model is not 
appropriate. They said there is nothing to show for security monitoring even 
when it is enabled because they do not receive regular reports or KPIs for the 
SOC service, and they feel cyber onboarding is very time consuming to 
rollout. 
 
From SMT perspective, they feel cyber onboarding is costing them far too 
much, hence it is an upscale project. They feel that the metrics and progress 
they receive from the onboarding team is not clear most times, and that the 
governance and structure between CSOC and Onboarding teams should be 
improved. 
 
Following the reframing matrix analysis (see Fig. 3), we conducted a further 
assessment to see if some of the viewpoints could converge. The 16 
viewpoints are now consolidated to 8 key factors that make cyber onboarding 
challenging and often perceived to be ‘broken’, as follows: 
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A) Complexity 
If cyber onboarding is simple then establishing a functioning SOC would not 
have been so difficult, unfortunately, this is not the case. The process to 
onboard a service is straightforward in principle (see Fig 2) but often 
challenging in practice. For example, a service to be onboarded may be hosted 
in multiple locations and comprising a myriad of different log sources, across 
the stack, ranging from physical, network, operating systems, middleware, 
databases to applications. In addition, for a cloud service, this may include 
hypervisors and/or containers, which also need to be monitored. Each of these 
stacks will need to be monitored to have a truly complete service onboarding. 
The problem is that many of these stacks produce logs and messages in 
varying formats (see Table 1) most of which are non-compliant with the IETF 
RFC 5424 standard, and a couple may include proprietary formats, especially 
applications coded in non-compliant formats, therefore the mechanism to 
ingest and normalise these events is not so trivial. All of these contribute to 
the complexity, complication and convolutedness. 
Additional factors contributing to complexity include A1-A3: 
 
A1) Architecture designs and patterns 
SOC design and architecture is not a one size fits all. Each service onboarding 
requires a unique design, and at best may leverage existing patterns which 
will still need to be adapted and implemented, and at worst, a new set of 
designs are to be produced. The design requirements may be different to the 
overall design of the SOC monitoring platform itself, therefore, each service 
to be onboarded will need its own design and solutions architecture, which 
may utilise existing network connectivity or the provisioning of a new 
network connectivity to transports logs, events or messages of the onboarded 
business services to the SOC platform for analysis, correlation and cyber 
incident triage. The network connectivity (local area networks included) may 
require a form of wide area network, routing, and security controls enabled to 
ensure that appropriate policies such as access controls, security groups, 
blacklisting and firewall policies are correctly implemented. 
 
A2) Risk assessment 
Each business services to be monitored has its own risks or concerns for why 
it needs security monitoring. For example, a bank implementing security 
monitoring for their online banking system may do so in order that the SOC 
will monitor its online bank transactions, hence the risks or concerns are about 
monitoring of their online banking transactions and ensuring the right 
customers and correct payments are made; however for a government 
department responsible for immigration or issuance of national passports, 
their risks and concerns for security monitoring is obviously different. Here, 
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their concern is to ensure that national passports are only issued to legitimate 
citizens, that passports are not flaunted on ‘black market’, and illegitimate 
documents are not used to obtain national passports. Security risks and 
concerns are bound to be different based on business functions for different 
corporations, institutions and government departments. These unique risks 
and concerns will need to be turned into security monitoring use cases and 
policies. This process requires niche skillsets, not trivial, and adds a layer of 
complexity, too. 
 
A3) Security monitoring requirements 
As organisations’ business offerings and services are different so are their 
security monitoring needs. Security monitoring requirements will differ 
among departments, business units and services, therefore onboarding of each 
department, business unit or service is bound to be subtly different. While 
onboarding may follow a fairly straightforward process, however, each 
business services onboarding requires unique set of solutions ranging from 
architecture pattern to monitoring use cases.  
 
Take two UK Government Departments for comparison. The Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) for example, their primary responsibility to the 
UK citizens and government is social welfare to UK citizens in the form of 
housing allowances, job seekers’ allowances etc. to appropriate UK citizens, 
and on a timely manner. Conversely, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is 
responsible for collecting taxes e.g. VAT, annual returns, PAYE, customs etc. 
from citizens and corporations, hence the former’s cyber security monitoring 
need is focusing on ensuring appropriate social welfare arrangements are paid 
to suitably qualified citizens while the latter ensures and enforces taxes are 
received from citizens and corporations. Of course, their security monitoring 
requirements are different and predicated on their business obligations. This 
goes to demonstrate again that security monitoring and cyber onboarding is 
not a one size fits all proposition. This uniqueness and tailoring of the cyber 
onboarding deliverables per business service onboarding adds a layer of 
complexity and intricacy. 
 
B) Strategic Support 
SOC, like every organisational cyber security programme, has a slim chance 
of success without strategic support from the senior management teams 
(SMT). Strategic support is particularly fundamental with SOCs because of 
its remit, since it serves both as a horizontal business function, and as a 
compliance mandate. Without strategic support, SOC will be unable to 
perform its role of compliance, audit and regulations. 
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One of the main challenges facing SOCs is having appropriate authority to 
conduct protective and security monitoring across an entire organisation if 
SMT have not lend their support and approval. SOC is a horizontal business 
function, meaning it should be instituted to serve all business units of an entire 
organisation and should have the prerequisite authority to perform audit, 
security compliance checks and as an enabler to drive continuous security 
improvements across the organisation. This is important since cyber-attacks 
can be exploited from any aspect of the organisation and may use a weakness 
in one aspect as a channel or conduit to exploit other parts of the business. 
Hence, SOCs must be empowered, as monitoring custodians, to perform its 
duties accordingly. 
 
C) Funding Model 
SOC is an upscale project, requiring the procurement and implementation of 
a myriad of cyber tools, such as SIEM, intrusion detection systems, flow 
analyser, transaction monitoring (web fraud detection), threat intelligence and 
possibly user and entity behaviour analytics (UEBA) etc. These tools can be 
expensive, including software licenses and professional services costs. In 
addition, the SOC needs facility – the physical operating environment, and 
human resources to operate and monitor the service and including handling 
incident response and management. Considering that the project, depending 
on the organisation’s size and scale, may last for a couple of years from start 
to go-live, and subsequently, the operational people aspect to manage and 
operate the SOC as normal business as usual (BAU) staff, who must still be 
costed, then, it is essential that the right funding model for the SOC exists. 
 
The absence of appropriate funding model is likely to impact the success, or 
the effectiveness of a SOC. SOCs are a medium to address cyber risk and 
encourage good cyber hygiene, it is therefore pertinent that SOC’s funding 
model is based around active risk reduction as other funding models is likely 
to encourage ‘wrong cyber behaviour’. For example, the ‘right cyber 
behaviour’ is to encourage active risk reduction as opposed to risk mitigation 
approach based on ‘low hanging fruit’. The reasons for this are that ‘easy and 
quick wins’ do not necessarily mean effective prioritisation and efficient risk 
reduction, because the ‘quick wins’ may not yield the same risk reduction. 
We posit that, based on risk proportionality, monitoring an organisation’s 
asset that is either marked for decommissioning or that is not particularly 
important to the organisation does not yield the same risk reduction as 
opposed to monitoring the origination’s customer database, or their 
intellectual property.  
 
 20 
Similarly, protectively monitoring a standalone guest WiFi just because the 
guest WiFi project is funded as opposed to offering the same security 
monitoring on citizens data based on risk reduction encourages wrong cyber 
behaviour. 
 
Our proposal to addressing the ‘cyber behaviour problem’, one we strongly 
recommend, is to ensure that SOC – here we mean SOC and its composite 
teams such as Cyber Onboarding – is directly funded. We distinguish 
between direct vs central funding. Direct funding, we define as funding 
allocated directly by the organisation, usually granted or assigned to a 
business unit and ringfenced for its purpose alone and secured through a 
business case. On the other hand, Central funding, we define as a type of 
funding arrangement which is obtained by collectively levying other business 
units as a contribution for payment of service they have received, or will 
receive, and are often referred to as ‘cross-charge’.  
SOCs should be directly funded to afford it the autonomy to onboard and 
monitor services that actively attribute to actual risk reduction. Prioritisation 
of services to be monitored by the SOC must not be decided or dictated solely 
on the basis that an individual business unit has funds or budget, but because 
the services to be onboarded are those that will reduce risk exposure in the 
ecosystem and to the organisation as a whole.  
 
The premise for onboarding a service just because the project has funds is 
totally unacceptable. We see this as one of the main drivers of wrong cyber 
behaviour across many government departments. Fundamentally, if a SOC is 
centrally funded, it means it has no choice as to which services it monitors, 
because it will be underpinned on ‘first come, first served’. That is, the SOC 
will serve those who have contributed or paid for their services and this may 
mean monitoring services of lesser priority/criticality over those that are 
significantly critical. 
 
D) Strategy 
Every efficient SOC has a clear strategy underpinned by the organisation’s 
Cyber Strategy. Every organisation should have a Cyber Strategy. An 
organisation cyber strategy is a blueprint for cyber, business transformation, 
business enablers, governance, risk and compliance. 
 
Organisation Cyber Strategy should adopt cyber principles that encourage, 
support and enable business and digital transformation agenda, e.g. digital by 
default, secure by default, active risk management, active defence, proactive 
and continuous monitoring, cyber resilience and recovery etc. These are the 
enablers of strong economic wellbeing, creating an environment where 
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businesses thrive by ensuring that digital technology and its frontier are 
secure. The UK Cyber Strategy (HMG, 2016), a blueprint for national cyber 
security strategy, aims to create an environment where businesses are 
confident, capable and resilient in transformational digital world.  
 
For both national and organisational cyber security strategy to be achieved, 
investments in SOC, Cyber Programme, Governance, Risk and Compliance 
(GRC), Personnel and Physical security, Cyber Security Training, Awareness 
and Education need to occur.  
 
E) Goals and Objectives 
With Cyber and SOC strategies come functional goals and objectives. 
Functional objectives help to achieve business goals, and both in turn enable 
the strategy to be achieved. To achieve the SOC strategy, high-level business 
goals which are fulfilled by low-level functional objectives must exist. A 
successful SOC function (comprising people, process and technology) is 
realised on overarching strategy, business goals and functional objectives. 
 
Using the Cyber strategy discussed in Section 4 as an example, a primary goal 
of the SOC will be to provide realtime security monitoring across the 
monitored estates. The rationale for this goal is that a goal must directly 
support its strategy; therefore, to support the SOC strategy of active defence 
and digital transformation a key enabler is proactive and realtime security 
monitoring. Further, a key functional objective to achieve the business goal, 
will be to ensure that the SOC has trained and capable personnel to operate 
the SOC (i.e. towards SOC maturity).  
 
For SOC to be successful, it must have clear set of goals and objectives that 
support its strategy, and the wider Cyber Strategy. 
 
F) Governance and Onboarding Prioritisation 
Every organisation should have governance boards, well-defined governance 
structure, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. At a strategic 
level, there should be a Cyber Governance Board accountable for Cyber. 
Membership to this board should include the following, at the very least, 
Cyber SRO, Director of Cybersecurity, Head of GRC, SOC Director/Head, 
Programme-Level Directors from Business Services. This board should be 
responsible for deciding on the critical services and systems, through a risk 
based prioritisation, to be onboarded for security monitoring. 
 
Further, organisational governance structure and hierarchy must be clear so 
that SOC knows who is in charge with clear point of escalation and reporting. 
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It is important that such structures are communicated not only to the SOC, 
but also, to the entire organisation. After all, security is everyone’s 
responsibility. 
 
There must be a clear set of rationale based on active risk management for the 
candidate systems and services to be prioritised. The risk-based prioritisation 
scheme should take into consideration such metrics as: sensitivity of the 
assets, criticality of the asset e.g. critical national infrastructure, value of 
business data it holds e.g. citizens data, business data, national data, cyber 
value at loss (CVaL), degree of susceptibility of attack, vulnerability of the 
asset, or that may exist with the controls currently protecting the asset, mean 
time to restore, disaster recovery targets, cyber response and recovery 
objectives etc. 
 
G) SOC Structure and Approach 
All the capabilities shown in Fig 1. should sit under one SOC structure. 
Getting a SOC structure right cannot be overstated. It is often the prime 
causes of an inefficient and immature SOC. The rationale for recommending 
that all the composite aspects of a SOC sits under one authority is because, it 
works better and more coherent under one leadership. 
 
If some of the functions, such as Cyber Onboarding were to be under a 
different structure or authority it will cause friction and fester the perception 
of ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality, which is needless. Secondly, coherence is key 
for an effective SOC. That is, the ability to have consistency in processes, 
administration, methodologies and communication. Communication is 
important. Information from the SOC to the entire organisation should be 
concise and consistent. 
 
A SOC structure should support and enable its approach. There are various 
approaches to operating a SOC, and in this, we are referring to the operating 
model rather than whether it is outsourced or insourced. The operating model, 
that is, the SOC operating service hours, for example, 24x7 or 9x5 or 7x7 plus 
on-call hours. Operating model is governed by business cases determined by 
the ways of working of all the other stakeholders performing reliant activities 
either for the SOC or to the business. 
 
Most SOCs operate 24x7 service, which means they work round the clock, 24 
hours in a day, 7 days in a week, including Saturdays, Sundays and bank 
holidays. While some SOCs operate 24x7, this could be arranged as 9x5 plus 
on-call for after hours and weekend; or 7x7 services complemented with on-
call for after hours. Either way, the objective is to have a service coverage 
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that supports the organisation’s risk appetite and that are relevant and 
efficient. 
 
It is pertinent to note that, for example, if a SOC operates 24x7, but some 
business teams or stakeholder groups are not, then it may make the need for 
24x7 SOC ineffective, because if an incident happens during non-working 
hours and the business teams that are needed to assist with the incident, e.g. 
networks and infrastructure teams are not 24x7, it then means that the incident 
will be queued to this team and will be in their queue until when they start 
work in the following morning. This is not an ideal case and one the puts the 
effectiveness of the SOC in jeopardy. 
 
SOC operating model must be approved by the SMT based on business case, 
benefit realisation and business efficiencies. It is important to note that, SOC 
can operate 24x7 in many formats efficiently as discussed prior. 
 
H) SOC Maturity 
SOC maturity is assessed against many factors, unfortunately, there is no 
consensus on the factors or criteria that should be used. In this paper, we have 
carefully selected five generic criteria, we believe should help with operating 
an effective SOC underpinned on risk reduction, in our assessment. Further, 
we have also provided a list of some quantitative and qualitative factors that 
organisations may consider when conducting SOC assessment of their own. 
 
The generic factors include: 
1. adequate and capably trained staff,  
2. robust SOC and Onboarding processes, policies and procedures, 
3. appropriately tuned SIEM tool, 
4. cyber incident management, reporting and investigation, 
5. threat intelligence and threat hunting. 
 
The maturity of a SOC can be assessed on other factors such as qualitative 
factors e.g.  
 quality of logging  
 how quickly the SOC can recover from a cyber-attack 
 how quickly they can respond to a significant cyber incident 
 cyber response and recovery readiness 
 forensic readiness 
 
On the other hand, SOC maturity can be assessed by quantitative factors 
such as: 
 the number of true positives or incidents the SOC detects 
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 the volume of data analysed in seconds or minutes,  
 the number of events processed,  
 the number of metrics used in the analysis, e.g. logs, events, flows, 
PCAP and traps (see Table 1) and  
 finally, if monitoring is across the full stack of infrastructure, 
operating systems, middleware, containers, databases and 
applications. 
Whichever criteria (generic, quantitative, qualitative or a combination of all) 
are used to assess the maturity of a SOC, there must be rationale for their uses. 
 
I) Supplier Incentive  
As discussed in Section Error! Reference source not found., to build a SOC 
service often involves multiple stakeholders ranging from internal teams e.g. 
SOC team, networks and infrastructure teams, to external organisations e.g., 
suppliers and professional services partners. 
 
For instances, a supplier may be responsible for hosting, another for 
management of existing legacy services and another for deployment of new 
services. Whatever their responsibilities are, to deploy a SOC multiple 
stakeholders are often required. Since the main objective of a SOC is to ensure 
that all services to be monitored, whether in the supplier environment, hosted 
applications or cloud-based applications are onboarded, therefore, the SOC 
will deal with a range of multiple stakeholders and should have a plan to 
incentivise suppliers and delivery partners in order that the desired outcomes 
are achieved. 
 
Supplier incentives could be by way of communication to the supplier 
community of the SOC strategy, and the need for cooperation in order for all 
assets to be onboarded.  This may include change notices and contract change 
notices (that is, payment related change notices), impacting and assessment 
processes that are lean and workable. In addition, supplier incentives may 
take other forms of collaborative frameworks or memorandum of 
understanding, such as co-location agreements or deployment of third-party 
applications into an existing hosting arrangements or procurement of new 
contractual arrangements. 
 
5 RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Recommendations 
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Our recommendations stem from arguments in the preceding sections of this 
paper. The recommendations are MoSCoW’ed (Must, Should, Could or 
Would) to highlight importance, as follows: 
a) An organisation must have a cyber strategy upon which SOC strategy 
and other programme-level strategies hinge, such as network 
operations centre (NOC) strategy, network and infrastructure 
strategy, programme management strategy etc. The absence of a 
cyber strategy will mean that there is no coherent organisation-wide 
blueprint to work toward, and this is likely to lead to standalone, 
tower-based models that are fragmented, isolated and divergent.  
b) A SOC strategy should support and enable the organisation’s cyber 
strategy and offer a mechanism to deliver the cyber strategy. 
c) Governance, structure and approach must exist, and are fundamental 
to achieving a fit for purpose and functional SOC. It is imperative to 
have clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and a distinct line 
of escalation and reporting, as these will build the enabling 
environment for an efficient SOC. 
d) All SOC composite teams as shown in Fig. 1 should be under one 
authority and governance structure as this will enable the SOC to 
operate much more efficiently. SOC is complex and adding extra 
layer of complexity by way of segmenting SOC composite teams 
under different governance may stifle SOC progress and its 
autonomy. 
e) Whether SOC is funded centrally or directly, having its own ring-
fenced funds devolved from individually funded projects allows it to 
make security decision based on risks rather than funding. 
Onboarding prioritisation or selection of candidate services to be 
continuously and protectively monitored based on funding drives 
wrong behaviour as we have seen in Section 4. Hence onboarding 
prioritisation of candidate system to be monitored must be based on 
active risk reduction. 
f) Finally, as SOC is both a horizontal business function and 
compliance mandate, therefore, it should be assessed so that business 
return on investment and return on cyber security investment are 
measurable. SOC maturity is one way of achieving this and it is 
pertinent that the organisation is clear on what metrics or criteria they 
want to use to measure this growth. As discussed in this paper, we 
have offered three sets of assessment factors including quantitative, 
qualitative and generic (see Section 4). 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
1. SOC is a major organisational investment driven by: 
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a. cyber security needs of detection, monitoring, response and 
recovery from cyber-attacks, especially since modern cyber-
attacks are emerging, complex and challenging. 
b. compliance mandate to satisfy regulatory and compliance 
obligations e.g. PCI DSS, ISO 27001 etc. 
2. Building an efficient SOC takes time and effort. Organisations must 
have a roadmap of SOC delivery aligned with capability and 
maturity. This is so that it can assess its achievements but more so, 
to be better planned. 
3. SOC is not a one-size-fits-all. Even when a SOC is built for a single 
organisation, business unit requirements will be different, and risks 
and concerns are likely to be subtly different and hence SOC and 
security monitoring use cases must be adapted, tailored and 
relevant. 
4. While SOC processes maybe straightforward, however its success is 
dependent on cooperation from multiple stakeholders, and in most 
cases suppliers; therefore, organisations that find themselves in a 
similar model should have an approach to incentivise suppliers and 
stakeholders in order that their overarching goals and objectives are 
accomplished. 
5. Finally, SOC must have an operating model, and this must be 
predicated on business case, relevance and wider stakeholders’ 
ways of working. For example, a SOC can operate 24x7 in multiple 
ways; and of course, should not operate 24x7 if the organisation’s 
business case and risk appetite dictate differently. 
 
6 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Three key areas of future work: 
 It will be helpful if research on organisational cyber security 
behaviour is conducted to assess what factors drive good or wrong 
cyber behaviours among organisations, e.g. compliance, funding 
models, governance structure, complexity etc.  
 It will be useful to have agreed set of SOC maturity metrics. While 
we have provided three compelling set of metrics (quantitative, 
qualitative and generic) on SOC maturity, we believe, it still requires 
further in-depth studies. 
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